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Abstract—We present a method for separating collided signals
from multiple users in the presence of strong and wideband inter-
ference/jamming signal. More specifically, we consider a massive
connectivity setup where few, out of a large number of users,
equipped with spreading codes, synchronously transmit symbols.
The received signal is a noisy mixture of symbols transmitted
through users’ flat fading channels, impaired by fast frequency
hopping jamming signal of relatively large power. In the absence
of any conventional technique suitable for the considered setup,
we propose a "model-driven" deep learning method, based on
convolution neural network, to suppress jamming signal from
the received signal, and detect active users together with their
transmitted symbols. A numerical study of the proposed method
confirms its effectiveness in scenarios where classical techniques
fail. As such, in a two user scenario with wideband jamming
signal of power 20 dB above the power any active user, the
proposed algorithm achieves error rates 10−2 for a wide range
of AWGN variances.
Index Terms—Massive connectivity, model-driven deep learn-
ing, multi-user detection, jammer suppression, convolutional
neural networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive machine type communication (mMTC) has been
identified as one of three broad categories of the emerging 5G
use cases and scenarios [1]. The mMTC embodies a random
connectivity setup consisting of hundreds, or even thousands,
of users that are in grant-free communication with the same
base station over a shared wireless channel and occasionally
transmit short messages that collide [2]. A variety of methods
have been proposed to separate colliding users. As such, [3],
[4] consider user messages comprising of the same, known
preamble and information-bearing payloads, while [5]–[7]
equip users with (non)orthogonal spreading codes to facilitate
their separation. Commonly, the proposed methods leverage
sparsity in the user activity domain to separate colliding users.
Separation of colliding users in the presence of an inter-
ference originating from other nearby systems or malicious
jammers has received much less attention despite being of
high practical importance. For example, a communication
system with a large number of IoT devices may be maliciously
jammed to the extent that messages delivering critical sensor
measurements cannot be recovered. Similar to recent work [8],
we consider a massive connectivity scenario with synchronous
users equipped with spreading codes whose transmissions are
subject to a relatively strong wideband jammer employing fast
frequency hopping. In comparison to [8], where users employ
different spreading codes over symbol periods, we assume
each user is assigned one spreading code and suppress the
jamming signal using a deep learning (DL)-based method.
Viewing the jammer suppression problem as the one similar
in nature to image denoising, we propose a DL architecture
inspired by state-of-the-art image denoising method [9] and
further enhance it by incorporating domain-specific knowledge
in its design. Finally, assuming the DL method yields a
jammer-free signal, we employ reduced dimension decorrelat-
ing (RDD) algorithm [7] to separate active users. The proposed
method is tested with simulations which reveal that error rates
around 1% can be achieved in scenarios of two colliding users
of equal power, jammed with a wideband signal 20 dB above
the level of any of the active users.
II. RELATION TO PRIOR WORK
A growing research body on grant-free massive connectivity
systems consider different scenarios and employ a variety of
sparsity-based recovery methods for user separation. As such,
element-wise [2], group-wise [10] and analog sparsity [6],
[7] are used to separate time and frequency synchronized
users whose channels are known on the receiver side. Ap-
proximate message passing has been leveraged to estimate
active users and their channels [11], as well as the transmitted
symbols [12]. A more challenging time and/or frequency
asynchronous systems are considered in [13], where user-
specific messages are transmitted for link acquisition over
unknown multi-path channels; [14], where users are equipped
with spreading codes and channel state information is available
on the receiver side; [5], where users also employ spreading
codes, their multi-path channels are unknown and maximum
delay spread is one symbol duration; and [4], where packets
transmitted over unknown channels are comprised of the same,
known preamble and random payload, and experience phase
noise impairments. Nevertheless, none of these works consider
a fairly realistic scenario where user transmissions are subject
to interference from other systems or malicious jammers.
Considering the setup, the closest works to this paper
are [15] and [8]. As such, [15] uses independent component
analysis (ICA) to separate users equipped with spreading codes
of unknown channels. However, one practical limitation of
that approach is that the maximum number of users N that a
single antenna ICA receiver can separate is N < 2S/3 − 1,
where S is the spreading factor. A combination of the robust
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principal component analysis (PCA) and ICA to separate users
employing spreading codes in the presence of a jamming
signal is proposed in [8]. This system assumes that each
user applies different spreading codes over symbol periods
within the transmitted packet, so that the received signal
is represented in a form that facilitates jammer suppression
and user separation using the robust PCA. Similar to [15]
and [8], we also consider a fast frequency hopping jammer
that imperils transmissions from multiple users. In comparison
to those works, each user in our setup is assigned a fixed
spreading code that does not change over symbol periods
and the number of users is not bounded by some fraction of
the spreading factor S, thereby leaving the robust PCA and
ICA techniques inapplicable for jammer suppression and user
separation.
Since user separation in the presence of jamming signal
in our setup is not amenable to conventional signal processing
methods, we resort to DL framework with the goal to suppress
the jammer and enable detection of active users and their
symbols. Despite its enormous success in other fields, DL has
recently started to gain interest as a supplement or alternative
to other approaches in communications [16], [17]. To the best
of our knowledge, DL has not been applied for jammer sup-
pression or, more generally, in massive connectivity systems
where users employ spreading codes. The DL architecture
used in the proposed method is a variation of the one used
in state-of-the-art DL method for image denoising [9], and
further enhanced by including domain-specific knowledge into
its design. The resulting algorithm can be viewed to as an
instance of a framework recently cast as model-driven DL [18].
III. SIGNAL MODEL
In the considered setup, N users are in communication with
a common base station/access point over a shared wireless
channel. The users are equipped with spreading codes of
spreading factor S. As such, user i’s chip-rate discrete-time
domain representation of the spreading code is si ∈ CS×1.
The spreading codes are arranged into a matrix of spreading
codes, S ∈ CS×N , such that its i-th column is si. We assume
the users are in perfect synchronization, meaning that they
have a common time reference as to when a symbol time
starts and ends. Each user sends a (possibly) precoded data
symbol xi which undergoes a frequency flat fading channel
hi ∈ C before it reaches the receiver. Since users share
communication channel, collisions occur when two or more
users send information during the same symbol period. The
mixture of the signals transmitted during one symbol period
is then given by
y = HSx (1)
where H is a diagonal matrix of users’ channels such that
[H]ii = hi, while x ∈ CN×1 is a vector of transmitted symbols
from all users such that if a user j is inactive, its corresponding
transmitted symbol xj = 0.
In addition to perfect time synchronization, another com-
mon approach in grant-free massive connectivity system is
to assume that all user channels are known at the receiver
side. We relax this assumption using the approach from [6]. In
short, channel reciprocity inherent to the time domain duplex
(TDD) system implies that the channel between the BS and
user i is equal to the channel in the opposite direction, hi.
Therefore, the BS broadcasts known pilot symbols that user i
receives and exploits to estimate its channel hi. Due to time
synchronization, all users are able to estimate their channels
in parallel. Assuming perfect channel estimation, each user
i precodes its symbol bi with normalized zero-forcing (ZF)
precoder such that its transmitted data xi before spreading is
given by
xi = bipi = bi
h∗i
|hi| (2)
where pi is the precoder. Substituting (2) into (1) yields
y = H˜Sb (3)
where H˜ is a diagonal matrix of user channels’ magnitudes,
i.e., H˜ = diag (|h1|, |h2|, . . . , |hN |), while b is a vector of
transmitted symbols. An inactive user is assumed to transmit
zero symbol and thus bi ∈M∪{0}, where M is the symbol
alphabet for the utilized modulation format.
The transmitted signals from active users are impaired by a
wideband jamming signal. Similar to [8], the jamming signal
is modeled as a fast frequency hopping signal, meaning that
the jammer quickly jumps over different and randomly chosen
frequencies during one symbol period. Formally, the chip rate
samples of the jamming signal are stacked into a vector z ∈
CS×1, given by
z =
[
Aej2pifk(k−1)+φk
]S
k=1
(4)
where A is the magnitude, and fk ∼ U[0, 1], φk ∼ U[0, 2pi)
are, respectively, uniformly sampled jammer’s frequency and
phase at the time instant of the k-th chip. In the most extreme
scenario, fk and φk change with each k. Alternatively, fk and
φk are piece-wise constant over a certain number of chips,
which is the case in our numerical study.
Accounting for noise, the chip-rate sampled received signal
is finally given by
r = y + z+ v (5)
where v is circularly symmetric additive white Gaussian noise
of variance σ2, i.e., v ∼ CN (0, σ2IS).
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
We describe in this part the proposed algorithm. In short, the
received signal is processed through a cascade of two blocks.
The aim of the first block is to suppress jamming signal and
output a clean mixture of signals transmitted by active users.
This mixture is then an input to the second block which outputs
the indices of active users, along with their detected symbols.
A. DL-based Jammer Suppression
The jammer suppression method is designed by learning a
discriminative model that maps a pre-processed received signal
r to the desired mixture of active users’ signals y. To guide
the selection of a DL model, we view jammer suppression
problem as analogous in nature to image restoration problem.
The image restoration problem has received a considerable
attention in the literature, and consequently we reduce the
search space for DL models by focusing on models that
have proven successful for image restoration, and, in partic-
ular, image denoising tasks. Building upon the state-of-the-
art image denoising model [9], our jammer suppression block
implements DL model shown in Fig. 1. The model consists
of D layers whose building blocks are convolution sublayer,
rectified linear unit (ReLu) activation, and batch normalization.
More specifically, the first layer processes the input signal
through convolution sublayer, followed by ReLu activation.
Each subsequent layer d, d = 2, . . . , D − 1, employs BN to
the ReLu activated output from the corresponding convolution
sublayer. Finally, a single convolution sublayer is the output
layer in the proposed DL model.
Fig. 1: DL architecture for jammer suppression.
The input to the proposed DL architecture is a tensor con-
sisting of two channels, as depicted in Fig. 2. The first channel
r˜ is formatted into a two-column matrix which contains real
and imaginary parts of the received signal r. The second
channel r˜′ is also formatted into a two-column matrix, with
real and imaginary parts of the match filter bank (MFB) output
rMFB in its columns. In particular, the received signal r is
processed through the MFB consisting of S filters, each tuned
to one spreading sequence sj , j = 1, . . . , S,
rMFB = S
Hr (6)
For an intuitive justification behind the incorporation of the
MFB output in the DL input tensor, we recall that the
first convolution layer computes weighted combination of the
neighboring entries in the input tensor over a patch whose
dimension is given by the size of the convolution kernel. In
particular, the entries from the ith row of the first channel
correspond to the ith chip’s samples of the received signal,
while the ith row of the second channel is the noisy sum of
the user i’s transmitted symbol and weighted combination of
the jamming signal’s chip-rate samples, where the weights are
the entries in the spreading code si. Thus, the first convolution
layer combines several consecutive samples of the jamming
signal and the weighted combinations of the entire jamming
signal, as well as the same number of consecutive samples of
the mixture of active users’ signals and the symbols transmit-
ted by active users. The remaining convolution layers compute
the weighted combinations of entries from their input tensors,
such that the whole model combines "local" information,
embodying consecutive samples of the useful signal y and
jamming signal z, with the "global" information, comprising
of the transmitted symbols xj and jamming signal projected
onto spreading codes, sHj z, with the goal to suppress the
jamming signal z and yield the mixture of active users’ signals
y. We emphasize that the proposed DL model belongs to the
class of model-driven DL, whereby enhancing a black-box DL
model with communication-specific domain knowledge results
in improved performance [18].
Fig. 2: Input tensor to the DL model.
As a side remark, we note that since the received signal is
a jammed version of the useful signal, the input tensor from
Fig. 2 resembles a distorted two-channel image and, hence, the
expectation is that the DL architecture yielding state-of-the-art
image denoising performance is also a promising approach for
de-jamming the received signal.
Having specified the DL architecture, its weights w are
estimated by minimizing the squared l2 norm of the error,
wˆ = argmin
w
K∑
k=1
‖yk −R(rk;w)‖2 (7)
where K is the number of training examples (rk,yk), gen-
erated according to (3) and (4), while R(·;w) denotes the
mapping from the received signal r to the DL output, param-
eterized by the weights w.
B. Symbol Detection
The recovery of active users and transmitted symbols is
described in this part. The output from the jammer suppression
block is first mapped into a complex domain signal y˜ ∈ CS×1.
Assuming the jammer suppression does not distort the mixture
of the transmitted users’ signals, the output y˜ is given by
y˜ = H˜Sb+ v˜ (8)
where v˜ models the residual (unsuppressed) jamming signal
and noise. The problem of detecting active users and their
transmitted symbols from (8) is essentially a sparse recovery
problem because only few users transmit at the same time,
resulting in a sparse vector of their symbols b.
We employ here the reduced dimension decorrelating algo-
rithm (RDD) [6], [7] to detect b from (8). The RDD is a sim-
ple, one-shot symbol detection method which cross-correlates
y˜ with each spreading code si to generate statistics ti corre-
sponding to the ith user. Assuming the number of active users
K is known (i.e., obtained by some other algorithm), the RDD
detects active users from the indices of K largest magnitudes
{|ti|}Ni=1. Finally, the RDD detects the transmitted symbol of
an active user by finding the constellation symbol closest in
the Euclidean sense to ti. We note that when spreading codes
are orthogonal, the RDD becomes a conventional match filter
bank (MFB).
As a final remark, our choice of the RDD algorithm is mo-
tivated by its simplicity and the fact that the focus of this work
is suppression of jamming signal. Consequently, the RDD does
not limit the generality of the proposed methodology and other
sparse recovery algorithms can be used to detect b from y˜.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
We consider a simulation scenario where each of N = 128
users is equipped with orthogonal spreading codes so that the
spreading factor S = 128. The users employ quadrature phase
shift keying (QPSK) modulation and precode the symbols
using normalized ZF precoder. The signal transmitted from
an active user has unit power and experiences a channel
with magnitude |hi| ∼ U[0.5, 1.5]. The normalized frequency
and phase of the simulated jamming signals, uniformly at
random sampled from [0, 1] and [0, 2pi), respectively, exhibit
100 jumps over 128 chips, implying that each frequency-phase
combination in the jamming signal lasts on average 1-2 chips.
The DL architecture from Fig. 1 implements D = 5
layers. Each convolution sublayer comprises of 32 convolution
filters (i.e., yields 32 feature maps), with the exception of
the last layer which implements a single convolution filter.
The convolution kernel in each layer covers 5 consecutive
rows and both columns (i.e., has dimension 5-by-2) and zero
padding is used. Each channel in the input tensor is normalized
with the maximum power of the corresponding signal. The
RDD processor boils down to a conventional MFB due to
orthogonality of the spreading codes. Assuming the number
of active users is known, the MFB outputs are used to detect
indices of active users and their transmitted QPSK symbols.
We trained and tested the architecture from Fig. 1 with more
layers and/or 16, 64 or 128 filters per convolution sublayer,
without observing a considerably improved performance. Also,
the tests with models where the BN is employed before ReLu
show performance deterioration by ∼0.5%, compared to the
case when the BN acts upon the ReLu activations, as is the
case in the used DL model. We note that our 5-layer model
is not as deep as those models where the BN was initially
suggested for as a regularizer. However, the tests without BN
yield slightly degraded performance, which is the reason why
we keep BN in our model.
The jammer suppression method is implemented using
TensorFlow framework [19]. The DL model parameters, corre-
sponding to a given jamming signal magnitude A and AWGN
variance σ2, are learned using the ADAM algorithm with batch
size 64 and 200 epochs over synthetically generated 200,000
training data points. The learned model is tested with 10,000
Monte-Carlo runs and error rate, defined as a ratio of runs with
wrong estimate of an active user index or transmitted symbol,
is computed. In other words, a successful run is declared only
when all active user indices and their transmitted symbols
are correctly detected. The conventional MFB is used as a
benchmark since, to the best of our knowledge, we are not
aware of any other jammer suppression method suited for the
considered setup.
The error rate dependence on AWGN variance for a model
trained for jamming signal power 20 dB and noise variance
−10 dB with respect to an active user’s transmitted signal
is shown in Fig. 3. As can be seen, in comparison to the
conventional MFB which yields error rates ∼ 95%, the error
rates of the proposed algorithm are around 1% for a smaller
and more practical AWGN variances. In the next test, the
AWGN variance is fixed to −10 dB and jamming signal power
is varied. The resulting error rate performance, shown in Fig. 4,
confirms that the proposed algorithm considerably outperforms
the MFB for stronger jammers.
Fig. 3: Error rate versus AWGN variance for a model trained
for jammer power 20 dB, AWGN variance −10 dB and two
active users.
The error rate performance of the proposed algorithm and
MFB benchmark for jammer power sweep and different num-
ber of active users is shown in Fig. 5. The underlying DL
model is trained for 5 active users, jammer power 20 dB and
AWGN variance −10 dB. We note that the test done in a
scenario of one active user does not yield any error over 10,000
runs for jammer powers between 10 and 14 dB. As expected,
the error rate performance deteriorates with the increasing
number of users. However, even though the model is trained
Fig. 4: Error rate versus jammer power for a model trained
for jammer power 20 dB, AWGN variance −10 dB and two
active users.
for 5 active users, the error rates are below 10% in scenarios
with up to three active users and for most considered jammer
powers.
Fig. 5: Error rate versus jammer power for a model trained
for jammer power 20 dB, AWGN variance −10 dB and five
active users.
VI. CONCLUSION
We consider in this work a massive connectivity system
where users are equipped with spreading codes and their trans-
missions are subject to interference from a relatively strong
wideband jamming signal. The jamming signal is suppressed
using a model-driven deep learning method that is based on
convolution neural network and takes as inputs the received
signal and the output from the match filter bank. The active
users and their symbols are detected from the de-jammed
signal using sparse recovery. The simulation study validates
the effectiveness of the proposed method in scenario where
conventional techniques fail. As such, error rates of around
1% are achieved in scenarios with 2 active users whose signals
are impaired by wideband jammer of power 20 dB above their
individual power levels.
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